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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
BERGIN BRUNSWIG COMPANY, AND 
ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 16456 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Apellant to 
obtain Workmen's Compensation benefits for injuries sustained 
while at work. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Following an evidentiary hearing held on January 4, 1979, 
the Industrial Commission denied any benefits to the Plaintiff-
Appellant on the basis that his injuries sustained during work 
were not compensable Utah State law. 
RELIEF ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Industrial commission's 
order, and for an Order awarding him the benefits allowed by law. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellant relies upon his rendition of the 
facts stated in his earlier brief as supported by the factual 
statement of the Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE 
FACTS AND PRESENT LAW 
In any legal forum, the parties thereto are bound to 
disagree somewhat as to the facts and to inferences which can 
be drawn from such facts. However, Defendant has so stretched 
the facts herein that Plaintiff-Appellant feels impelled to 
reply to the most blatant misconstructions. 
1. In its brief, Defendant continuously refers to 
Plaintiff-Appellant as the "aggressor" of the horseplay involvec 
herein. 
Such an assertion is mere wishful thinking. Defendant 
admits that Plaintiff-Appellant was performing his assigned 
duties when he was attacked by two fellow employees (Defendants 
Brief, pp. 3, 20). Two fellow employees flipped elastic bands 
at the Plaintiff-Appellant. (R. at 19, 36). One of the two 
"attackers" thereupon took an eighteen (18) inch piece of wood 
d 
and rushed the Plaintiff-Appellant in a playful manner, pretenJ 
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the stick was a sword. (R. at 19). In self defense, Plaintiff-
Appellant grabbed the stick out of the fellow employees grasp. 
Plaintiff thereupon took one of the elastics and the.wooden 
stick and attempted to flip the stick away "into the air". 
(R. at 30) . The full cycle of the foregoing events probably 
took less than thirty (30) seconds. Nevertheless, Defendant 
argues that although attacked by fellow employees, although 
using only those items by which he was attacked, and although 
he only tried to flip those items away, somehow that chain of 
events transformed Plaintiff-Appellant into the "aggressor" 
and out of the realm of compensation benefits. 
Such logic is an attempt to distort the facts from 
what really happened Plaintiff-Appellant was attacked while 
engaged in his work. In an attempt to flip away the sword and 
rubber band by which he had been attacked, he was injured. Such 
an injury, as described by earlier cases of this court, is clearly 
within the bounds of compensability. 
2. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff-Appellant has not 
only failed to specify alleged errors in the Administrative 
Law Judge's Findings, conclusions, and Order, but that 
Plaintiff-Appellant has somehow waived such objectives. 
Aside from the fact that the Industrial Commission 
itself admitted in its Order Denying Review that the Findings, 
Conclusions, and Order were "not correct" (R. at 97), Plaintiff-
Appellant very exhaustively treated each such error in his 
-3-
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"Motion for Review of Order" (R. at 89). Such Motion was not 
only strenuously made in the lower forum but is included as part 
of the record on appeal. 
It seems rather incongruous to argue that even though 
the Industrial Commission admitted the errors, Plaintiff-
Appellant has now waived them on appeal despite his reference 
to such admission and his reference to the record wherein he 
more adequately corrected the errors 
The reference to the medical panel report is only 
indicative of the amount of care taken in the preparation of the 
Findings, Conclusions, and Order by the Administrative Law Judge, 
3. Defendant's analysis of the landmark case of Twin 
Peaks Canning co., et al v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 57 
Utah 589, 196, Pac. 853 20 A.L.R. 872 (1921) is also misleadi~. 
Defendant asserts that the injury therein occured during activitis 
of work. However, the injury occurred at a time when the 
"aggressor" had completely abandonedhis work. As stated by 
the court: 
"Neither the deceased nor Mitchell was 
required to perform any duties whatever 
on the second floor, nor was either 
required to go there for any purpose." 
196 P. at 854 
The court also stated: 
"The accident thus occured as the result 
of what in the books is ordinarily 
denominated as practical joking, horseplay, 
or pranks." 196 P. at 855. 
-4-
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Despite Defendant's attempts to distinguish Twin Peaks 
from the present situation, despite Defendant's attempts to minimize 
the case's significance because of its age, despite Defendant's 
attempts to argue that the law should be different. today than 
it was earlier, and despite Defendant's reference to the case law 
of other states and philosopichal treatises on theoretical 
propositions for Workmen's Compensation benefits, the law in Utah 
is still the same and Twin Peaks is totally on point. 
To assert that Workman's Compensation benefits should 
be denied to Plaintiff herein who was attacked while working 
but to allege that the aggressor-deceased in Twin Peaks was 
properly awarded compensation lacks inconsistency at best. 
Furthermore, Defendant assails Plaintiff's citation of older cases 
but does not hesitate to refer itself to the Commercial Casualty 
case (1928), the Sullivan case (1932) , the Pacific Employers case 
(1936) the Horn case (1940), etc. Plaintiff-Appellant asserts 
that the age of the case, although noteworthy, does not make 
the legal arguments therein obsolete, particularly when they have 
not been overturned. The Twin Peaks case has been specifically 
reaffirmed several times since its decision. See e.g. M & K 
Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 
(Utah 1948). 
4. Defendant's reference to case law of other states 
(as well as Plaintiff-Appellant's reference to such cases) must 
be v · · iewed with guarded caution. The statutory prerequisites in 
other states often differ from that of the State of Utah. Even Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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as discussed in Twin Peaks: 
"In most of the states the statutes 
cover accidents 'arising out of and 
in the course of employment,' whITe 
our statute [cite omitted) covers all 
accidents 'arising out of or in the 
course of employment.' .• ~. It is 
important to keep the distinction in 
mind when the compensation cases from 
the various jurisdictions are considered." 
196 P. at 856. (Emphasis added) 
... 
Thus, al though interesting to note how other jurisdic-
tions may have handled workmen's compensation claims, such 
decisions may be entirely inappropriate to Utah law for the 
reasons observed in Twin Peaks. Plaintiff-Appellant submits 
that the Utah case law is clear on the subject of accidents 
involving horseplay, and that what Defendant is really sug-
gesting to this Court is that it overule nearly sixty years of 
precedent and to adopt the position of some other states whose 
statutory prerequisite are different than our own. 
5. Defendant, in its brief, proposes this Court adopt 
the standard for "horseplay" cases proposed by Professor 
Arthur Larson in his treatise "Workmen's Compensation Law"· 
Even if the Court were to adopt such a standard, the Plaintiff. 
Appellant's injury would still fall within the bounds of compei 
sation. Applying Professor Larson's test, the injury would 
have occurred as follows: 
A. The extent and Seriousness of the Deviation. The 
Plaintiff-Appellant was engaged in his work at the time of the 
playful "attack" by his fellow employees. His only "deviation 
from that work was the normal response of self-defense to the 
_c:._ 
--
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attack and in flipping away the objects which were directed 
towards him. Such a brief "deviation" from employment hardly 
qualifies as a serious departure from his assigned duties as 
to deny him Workmen's Compensation benefits. 
B. Completeness of the Deviation. Plaintiff-Appellant 
has admitted that flipping rubber bands was not part of his 
assigned duties. As a result Defendant.asserts Plaintiff-
Appellant has admitted a complete abandonment of his work. 
Such is not the case. The "tools" of the horseplay were 
objects the employees worked with and provided by the employer; 
the horseplay itself was a normal occurrence at the ware-
house, and the thirty-second deviation from work in the wake 
of an "attack" by fellow employees is hardly substantial 
under the circumstances. In retrospect, Plaintiff-Appellant 
can hardly imagine what more he could have done under the 
circumstances to merit compensation. Should he have ignored 
the flying rubber bands and sword attack or was he justified 
in defending himself and in shooting away the sword and rubber 
bands? 
C. The Extent to ·which the Practice of Horseplay Had 
Become an Accepted Part of Employment. 
Despite Defendant's attempts to minimize the frequency 
of the rubber band fights, those who participated therein 
testified they occurred from "once a day or twice even" to 
"constantly" (R. at 22, 36). The supervisor testified he 
was not aware of their occurrence as frequently as that, but 
-7-
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was aware of their occurrence (R. at 46-48) . A l n emp oyer 1 s ig. 
norance of an activity is not proof that it doesn't exist. 
Furthermore, the employer is charged with constructive 
knowledge that boys of youthful age are often involved in horse-
play. As stated in Twin Peaks: 
. "Every employer understands that, in 
case boys of immature years are employed, 
he is charged with notice of their natural 
propensities to congregate, to communicate, 
and to play with one another." 196 P. at 
858. 
Although Defendant argues that a boy of twenty-one 
years of age is no longer a boy, but a man of maturity and 
wisdom, Plaintiff-Appellant submits that there is no magic 
age at which one acquires those attributes and instantaneously 
casts aside his "natural propensities" for fun. The issue ~ 
this regard is one of degree, not whether he still retains 
all such propensities or has outgrown them all . 
. D. The Extent to Which the Nature of the Employment 
May be Expected to Include Some Such Horseplay. 
Defendant argues in this respect that it was unfor-
seeable to the employer that its employees "would flip elasti~ 
or other projectiles at each other". (Defendant's Brief, P· 11: 
This inconsistent statement follows just two pages in Defendant' 
brief from the readmission that the employment supervisor had 
"observed the elastic flipping" on several occasions. (Defe~ 
dant's Brief, p. 15). 
Thus, not only was such activity "foreseeable", the 
supervisor had specific knowledge that such activities existed. 
-8- sf 
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Defendant quotes Professor Larson's hypothetical 
about young boys being hired to pick tomatoes and asserts 
that the employer should know that before long a tomatoe 
will be thrown. 
Plaintiff-Appellant submits that playing young boys 
(or men as Defendant prefers to call them) in an environment 
of boxes held together by many rubber bands, that the employer 
should normally expect rubber band fights. Indeed, this case 
bears that expectation out. 
CONCLUSION 
The Workmen's Compensation statutes were enacted to 
lLmit the employers' liability towards multifarious employee 
lawsuits and to provide to employees a system of benefits 
for work-related injuries. To deny Plaintiff-Appellant such 
benefits in this case would not only be contrary to existing 
precedent but would contravene the policy of workmen's compen-
sation laws itself. 
.,.. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _jJ__ day of January, 1980. 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
4th Floor Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-3350 
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